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Urban and regional design: a practical science
I. T. Klaasen Delft University of Technology, Netherlands

Abstract
Widely held notions such as the uniqueness of each design and design situation and of learning the
design craft in a studio with ‘apprentice’ and ‘master’ relationships, have hitherto left little room for
thinking about urban design as a science.
In this paper it is argued that urban and regional design is basically a practical science like
medicine, applied psychology and other technical sciences. In a practical science the objective of
research is the application of science : research is focused on ‘what is possible’, be it desirable or
not (yet) desirable. Practical sciences differ inter alia from empirical ones in that the concept of
falsification (and conversely verification) has only limited application, owing to the complexity and
heterogeneity of the concrete contextual conditions, and in some cases also of temporal and/or
financial and/or ethical considerations. All these constraints apply in the case of urban design.
A heuristic research approach as developed by the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos is
particularly suitable to develop a body of knowledge for urban and regional design, be it that the
focus is on the context of discovery, instead of on the context of justification. Some examples of
knowledge generated by this approach, in the form of ‘spatial organization principles’, are
presented.
‘To approach a city, or even a city neighborhood as if it were a larger architectural problem, capable
of being given order by converting it into a disciplined work of art, is to make the mistake of
attempting to substitute art for life.’ (Jane Jacobs The Death and Life of Great American Cities
1961: 373)
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Urban and regional design: a practical science
The field of urban and regional design
An implemented design of an urban area imposes long-term conditions on social processes, such as
the opportunities people have to organize their lives in temporal/spatial respects in a healthy and
safe living environment, and on the way social, cultural and economic institutions are able to
function. ‘Cities are the largest and most complex objects that human beings make’ state Hillier and
Penn (1991:2). In a world like ours, suffused as it is with scientific knowledge and its applications,
one might reasonably expect the construction of these ‘objects’ to be scientifically based. This is all
the more so considering that the functioning of neither people nor institutions can be described as
trouble-free. Problems include the continued dispersal of regional facilities resulting in increasing
traffic congestion (Klaasen and Jacobs 1999), the failure to create favourable conditions for
mobility chains, inadequate use of location values (ibid.), ill-considered siting of metropolitan
functions, the difficulty of accessing hospitals for people without private transport, poorly sited bus
and rail halts, public spaces which are difficult to keep clean, windswept crossroads and perilous
cycle routes. These spatial impediments are bad enough in themselves, but they also contribute to
the inequality of opportunity among individual and social groups.
In the professional world, however, but for a few exceptions (e.g. Langenhuizen, Ouwerkerk and
Rosemann 2001) little interest has been shown in scientific approaches to urban and regional design
[1], certainly in recent decades. Widely held notions such as the uniqueness of each design and
design situation, such as urban design being an artistic activity based on individual creative
capacities or focussed on conserving our cultural heritage, have hitherto left little room for thinking
about urban design as a science. Neither has the custom of learning the design craft in a studio with
‘apprentice’ and ‘master’ relationships.
One explanation for the non-scientific status attributed to urban and regional design may be the
tremendous complexity of the ‘object’, the urban area. At the same time, the considerable inborn
adaptive capacity of mankind undoubtedly plays a role too (Huisman 1996). Another factor is that
people tend to regard urban and regional design as a special case of architecture - albeit on a
different scale or concerned with public space, as opposed to architecture which is concerned with
buildings (Meyer e.a.2000). Not surprisingly then, the aspect of experiential value (or ‘beauty’),
possibly but not necessarily related to cultural history, receives as much attention in urban design as
it does in architecture. For example, urban design, including regional design, is one of the artistic
categories for which the Dutch Prix de Rome is awarded. This conception of urban and regional
design clearly does not leave much room for a scientific approach to the field.
In as far as designers concern themselves with a science of urban and regional design, the focus is
mainly on the process: the development of procedural theories for design. However, substantive
scientific knowledge impinges rather on the context of the design activity: on formulating present
and future social needs, on implementation processes and on the evaluation of implemented
designs. Apart from collections of historical examples and certain checklists, scarcely any work has
been done to create a theoretical base for design in the form of a systematically assembled body of
knowledge which can be drawn on in the design process. Research into the phenomenon of the
‘city’ and into the development of this concept take place mainly in the sciences of geography,
sociology and history.
To look upon urban and regional design as a form of architecture, however, overlooks the real
difference between the way people experience a building, i.e. katascopically (from the outside
inwards), as opposed to a city or city district, i.e. anascopically (from the inside outwards). The
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latter implies that the experiential value achieved is conditional on the use value. If for this reason
alone, use value should take priority over design in the narrow sense when applied to cities or city
districts (see Klaasen 2000). It must be borne in mind, however, that design in the narrow sense is
an integral part of use value in that it provides support for the functional organization of the city. It
helps people to find their bearings in and to identify - culturally, historically and personally - with
their environment, and meets the need for aesthetically or otherwise attractive abiding and
movement spaces.
Given that urban and regional design, seen from the standpoint stated here that use value takes
priority over design in the narrow sense, is indeed a science, two questions arise:
1. What kind of science is it? And,
2. How can we build up a body of scientific knowledge?

Practical sciences
Every urban or regional design is unarguably unique. The same could be said of every patient who
visits a doctor’s surgery or psychotherapist, or of every design for a teapot. Yet medical,
psychological or technical decisions are based on scientific knowledge. Teapots provide a
conveniently tangible example (see Fig.1).

Fig.1: four ‘teapot’models.
Pouring tea from these four teapots could be a precarious business. A knowledge of the physics of
communicating vessels, whether explicit or implicit, would save a great deal of messy
experimentation.
The uniqueness of each specific design cannot justify denying a scientific character to urban and
regional design. Unique spatial patterns can be seen as constructions of reproducible ‘building
blocks’. These ‘building blocks’ must of course be adapted to the situation in hand, which means
there is still room for design in the traditional sense.
In order to distinguish it from formal and empirical scientific knowledge, I refer to the kind of
scientific knowledge for which I have used the metaphorical term ‘building blocks’ as an instance
of ‘practical scientific knowledge’. Practical sciences are those sciences which have the application
of science as their object of research (Peursen 1986: 61). That is a different matter from the
application of science to concrete cases. Similarly, a practical science, such as applied psychology
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for example, does not consist solely of knowledge obtained in practice (Drenth 1995:157). The
same scientific rules and standards apply to both types of science: ‘both types of research lead to
generalizable insights and laws. The difference concerns only the origin of the research question
and the intention of the research.’ (ibid.:152). Or, as Thagard and Croft (1999:134) put it, ‘Despite
the differences in the form of the questions asked ... , there is no reason to believe that the cognitive
processes underlying questioning … are fundamentally different.’ The knowledge obtained through
research is, as in an empirical science, in principle objective (intersubjective) in character.
Subjective value judgements come into play only in a concrete application.
The object of practical science can be equally a process, such as an agricultural technique, or a
product. In the case of urban and regional design, the product is the built environment (including
infrastructure and recreational areas) and its relation to its environing natural (and possibly rural)
systems.
Given the extrascientific problem definition, a monodisciplinary approach is unlikely to be fruitful
in a practical science. A practical science is a task-bound ‘conglomerate’ of two or more (empirical
and/or formal) sciences (Veen 1976:19). As an illustration, if we ignore the practical task of curing
people, medical science falls apart into biology, chemistry, psychology etc. (ibid.).
The ultimate (critical) question that a practical science has to address is not ‘what is true?’ but ‘does
it work?’ In more precise terms, does the knowledge yielded make effective action possible in
specific situations - be it desirable or not (yet) desirable.
Invaluable in this connection is knowledge of the conditions under which action (leading to a
product or process) is justifiable, and an understanding of intentional/unintentional (or
desirable/undesirable) effects the action will have. Since practical sciences usually have a direct
impact on society, the question of ‘does it work’ has to be considered in an ethical context.
The future state of affairs is thus a matter of concern both to the practical and empirical sciences,
although from different perspectives:
empirical science

(intersubjective)
knowledge

practical science

(intersubjective)
knowledge

what will probably be progress generated by
the case
intrascientific
considerations
what could be the case progress generated by
extrascientific
considerations

Figure 1: empirical and practical science compared.
Not everything that can become reality (‘the possible’) is indeed realizable in every possible set of
circumstances (Peursen 1986: 97). This is a consequence of the fact that the knowledge is
generalized in character, and peculiarities of specific situations have been ignored (Radder 1996: 23).
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practical science
application of practical
scientific knowledge

(intersubjective)
knowledge
decision taken in
reasonableness

what could be the case in
the general sense
what is concretizable in a
specific situation, given
conditions and expected
effects.

Figure 2: practical science and the application of scientific knowledge compared.

The conduct of science
The rules laid down, mainly in the twentieth century, for the conduct of science were formulated
with the empirical sciences in mind. An important rule concerned distinguishing the ‘context of
discovery’ from that of ‘justification’. The ‘context of discovery’ was explicitly classed as external
to science proper. Adherents of this view, which was introduced by members of the Vienna Circle,
included Karl Popper. Popper instigated a revolution in the philosophy of the scientific method by
rejecting the idea that science must strive to verify hypotheses, and replacing it by the idea of
progress by the falsification of hypotheses. Increasing doubts were voiced from the 1960s onwards
about the validity of this strict distinction as a criterion of science (for example Kuhn 1962; Putnam
1974; Urbach 1978). David Gooding (1996) argued on the basis of historical examples from the
natural sciences that rationality and creativity do indeed meet head on in the ‘context of discovery’,
when anomalies (unexplained deviations from current theories) give rise to ‘abductive inference’.
New hypotheses, he proposes, come about through complex cognitive processes.
This is not to say that there are standard recipes for generating scientific hypotheses, or that such
recipes could be developed. There exists no algorithmic method, no defined set of rules, for
obtaining new scientific knowledge, but the generation of new knowledge is not based on purely
arbitrary processes: ‘… the search has turned to looking for “logics” in some weaker sense.
Heuristic procedures, strategies for discovery, and the like are explored.’ (Audi 1995 : lemma
‘abduction’). Van Koningsveld (1976: 201) describes heuristics as the mass of suggestions, hints
and unformulated rules that induce researchers to investigate some avenues of research as
potentially fruitful while blocking off other avenues of research. Heuristic rules are rules of
behaviour that promote finding things in the ‘context of discovery’ (Roozenburg & Eekels 1991:
42). Heuristic strategies like ‘abduction’ and ‘plausible reasoning’ make use of explorative models,
analogies, metaphors, tacit knowledge and other non-empirical considerations (Radder 1997). The
method of ‘abduction’, a term which originates from the philosopher C. S. Peirce (1839-1941)
‘merely suggests that something may be.’ (Hanson 1958: 85). ‘The form of the inference is this:
some surprising phenomenon P is observed; P would be explicable as a matter of course if H were
true; Hence there is reason to think that H is true.’ (ibid.: 86). Von Schomberg (1991: 58) proceeds
from this to define ‘plausible reasoning’ as the derivation of a defensible standpoint from partly
inconsistent data and/or in the absence of data. Models, in particular visual representations, play an
important part in plausible reasoning. ‘Visual representation is a powerful tool for science when
sufficient constraints are incorporated into the reasoning process’, Nercessian (1999: 20) stated at a
congress titled ‘Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery’.

Context of justification versus context of application
The realization that cognitive processes are at work in the ‘context of discovery’ is more important
for the practical sciences than for the empirical sciences [3]. This realization creates room for the
development of urban and regional design in a scientific direction.
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As in the empirical sciences, efforts in practical sciences are directed at testing hypotheses and
theories (empirically or otherwise) under controllable, repeatable conditions (a ‘lab situation’). In
the practical sciences, however, one is less likely to seek a context in which the hypothesis or theory
will be falsified as much as one in which it will be corroborated. On the basis of a series of
applications, probable conclusions can then be drawn about necessary conditions and resulting
effects. Hillary Putnam recognized this as long as 30 years ago: ‘Since the application of scientific
laws does involve the anticipation of future successes, Popper is not right in maintaining that
induction is unnecessary. Even if scientists do not inductively anticipate the future (and, of course,
they do), men who apply scientific laws and theories do so. And don’t make inductions’ is hardly
reasonable advice to give these men.’ (Putnam (1974) 1991:122).
There are several reasons why such a lab situation cannot always be created.
•

Ethical considerations may prevent the experimental testing of a hypothesis of practical
science, notably when people would be involved in the experiments.

•

Sometimes financial considerations stand in the way, particularly where large ‘objects’ are
concerned. The use of scale models may prove useful here, but one always has to be alert for
the risk of ‘overstretching’ the model.

•

Time, too, is a potential bottleneck in various respects.

•

Experiments may require time that is unavailable because the requirement for effective
action is too urgent.

•

The conditions may be subject to long-term changes which cannot be artificially accelerated.

•

Changes in conditions which occur in the course of time may also be extremely
unpredictable, particularly for processes and/or products where a large ‘temporal grain’
stands in the way of long-term corroboration.

In situations such as these, one either withholds from applying the theory, or relies on the feedback
from the application of theories in various situations with successively unique conditions. A series
of applications can lead to conclusions (albeit cautious ones), in the manner of ‘under a certain
range of conditions, it is not improbable that effect X will occur’, but only subject to the proviso
that the conditions have a measure of consistency. If a certain assumption turns out to be
inapplicable in practice or the effects are not the expected ones, there are two possibilities: either
the theory is inadequate, or the specific conditions under which its application took place were
misconstrued.
Since, if laboratory-type experiments are possible they delivery merely corroboration, and if only
practical applications are possible these may occur under once-only conditions that are only roughly
similar on each occasion, a scientific or at least rational underpinning of hypotheses (‘context of
discovery’) is even more necessary in the case of practical sciences than that of empirical science.
In the practical sciences therefore the term ‘justification’ loses much of its meaning. It seems more
appropriate to speak of the ‘context of application’. This context does not supply a justification of
hypotheses/theories so much as feedback for a heuristic approach to the ‘context of discovery’.
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A scientific perspective for urban and regional design
I conclude from the points raised above that urban and regional design is, at least potentially, a
practical science. However, urban and regional design occupies a unique place within the practical
and technical sciences. This is because all the above-mentioned potential constraints on the ‘context
of justification’ or the ‘context of application’ do in fact occur. A laboratory situation is uncreatable
because of
-

the large financial investment required before anything can be tested;
the long time required for the implementation of proposals;
the long period over which validity would have to be tested;
ethical complications.

As to the ‘context of application’, the following complications occur:
-

the conditions under which proposals are implemented in practice show relatively few
similarities;
the conditions cannot be even partially manipulated - there is very little ethical scope for
experimentation in practice.

In this light, the conduct of the science of urban/regional design must concentrate on the ‘context of
discovery’, on what is presumed to be possibly true. Empirical and formal scientific knowledge
must supply the necessary constraints. This constitutes an answer to the first of the two questions
formulated above.

Developing a scientific body of knowledge
The second question, how can we go about creating a body of scientific knowledge, brings me, as a
scientific realist (and how can one be anything but a realist in the practical sciences?) to the
Popperian follower Imre Lakatos (1922-1974), most of whose work was only published
posthumously (Lakatos 191976, 1978, 1999). Lakatos devised a heuristic approach in which the
term ‘theory’, as a hypothesis open to falsification, is replaced by the concept of a ‘research
programme’, which comprise both chains of theories and methodologies. He renounces the ‘strict’
falsificationalism of Popper. A research programme consists of a ‘hard core’ and a ‘protective belt
around the hard core’ (1978: 104) . He follows Kuhn to the extent of proposing that the hard core
should be considered temporarily immune to criticism (ibid.). He proves to be a true disciple of
Popper, however, in the emphasis he places on seeking counterexamples (‘monsters’ – Lakatos
1976) to strengthen hypotheses and theories by a process of falsification (ibid.). Lakatos
distinguishes two kinds of counterexample: local and global counterexamples. The first results in an
improvement of the argumentation, while the second refutes the hypothesis or theory. This
refutation is then used as a basis for seeking tacit assumptions implicit in the theory and making
them explicit (because they may be wrong). He explains this methodology by reference to modelcontrolled thought experiments. ‘A “model” is a set of initial conditions (possibly together with
some observational theories) which one knows is bound to be replaced during further development
of the programme, and one even knows, more or less, how. This shows once more how irrelevant
“refutations” of any specific variant are in a research programme: their existence is fully expected,
the positive heuristic is there as a strategy both for predicting (producing) and digesting them.’
(ibid.: 51). Contrary to general suppositions, he demonstrates that deduction can lead to an increase
of content. ‘If a deduction does not increase content I would not call it deduction, but ‘verification’.
(ibid.:81).
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Radnitsky noted in the 1970s that Lakatos’ heuristic is a methodology that addresses the context of
discovery. ‘The structural study of hypothesis generation is not only compatible with but is
suggested and guided by the Popperian approach’ (Radnitsky 1979: 251 note).
Lakatos rules for the development of knowledge offer the prospect of scientific theorization in
urban and regional design, considering the importance attached in that field to heuristics, deductive
guesswork and the manipulation of pictorial (visual) models, which are recognized in advance as
unimplementable but serve only to boost understanding. Not that the rules have to be followed to
the letter, but they can serves as a general guide.

Some ‘spatial organization principles’ for urban and regional design
Research taking place in accordance with this guideline in the Urbanism cluster of the Delft Faculty
of Architecture towards principles (‘building blocks’) for urban and regional design relates both to

‘spatial organization principles’ (a term devised within this research project) and to theoretical
models for urban and regional scale designs. Some examples of ‘spatial organization principles’ are
shown below.
Fig.2: organization principles for transport links: a. radial structure; b. tangential structure.
The universal spatial organization principles at city level are here, a. the radial mobility structure
that is desirable to make collective transport possible, and b. a tangential structure that is necessary
for private car transport. Collective transport calls for the ‘bundling’ of transport movements, while
cars benefit from distribution, owing to their relatively large space demand both during driving and
when parked. At a smaller scale, low-speed individual transport (walking, cycling) is once again
availed by bundling and thus by a radial pattern. The bundling of transport movements creates
opportunities for symbiosis (among other things public safety) along the routes and reduces the
financial and spatial investment for a given link.

Fig.3: organization principles for the siting of collective functions at neighbourhood level.
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In a, the centre of a circle is in a homogeneous situation, generally the most easily accessible place
and thus appropriate for siting collective functions. The radius of the circle is a criterion for the
functional spatial quality - the time and energy required for assumedly equivalent movement
options (walking, cycling). The residential density and the surface area of the circle a joint criterion
for the potential quality of the collective functions. In b and c, the residential area is linked to the
outside world. All residents and visitors pass through a single entry point. In b the point is a bus or
metro station, one of the collective functions that are situated in the central zone. In c, the entry
point is e.g. a town-centre parking garage located on the edge of a pedestrians-only residential area.
Example d has a combination of a bus or metro station and a parking garage. The zone between the
centrally sited station and the eccentrically sited parking garage now has the highest location value
for collective functions.

Fig.4: an example (at regional level) of a spatially determined - visual-spatial - organization
principle.
The relation between the viewing distance and the visibility of spatial objects is affected by among
other things the curvature of the earth. The connection between the height of an object and the
distance at which it remains visible is non-linear. This is relevant both to the siting of features such
as of landmarks and to the prevention of visual pollution.

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

9

Fig.5: accessibility study.
a shows a limitless space that has not been made accessible. All points in this space are equal in
terms of (un)accessibility. b depicts this space again but adds access by means of a road (individual
transport). This makes a zone along the road accessible: say, the limits of the marked zone can be
reached in 10 minutes walking at right angles to the road. In c access to the area is provided by a
rail link, or rather railway stations (collective transport); the zone depicted in b has been
transformed into separate (10 minute) circles around these stops.
The area around the crossing of the two roads in d is the most accessible site because it can be
reached from four directions instead of two. We now have created a hierarchy in accessibility along
the original path or road. The same goes for the railroad crossing in e. The crossings in both d and e
are features of a radial system. Tangential systems on the other hand result in equality of
accessibility. All sites in f will be accessible in at the most 10 minutes walking from a road. A
tangential railway system on the other hand will still result in a variation in accessibility unless the
users density is very high indeed, making overlapping circles possible (g; Manhattan?). In that case
of course, private transport would be out of the question, as there simply wouldn’t be enough room
for all the cars. Transportation by bicycle, would probably still be possible. Private (car)
transportation will probably already be problematic in the situation depicted in d. By adding a ring
road as is the case in h, the resulting accessibility along this tangential road equals that at the
crossing itself. It might indeed be even greater, depending on the quality of the radial roads inside
its perimeter.

Notes
[1]

[2]
[3]

‘Urban and regional design’ is the translation of the Dutch term stedebouwkundig ontwerpen
which I have chosen for the purpose of this paper. I have added the adjective 'regional’
because the English term ‘urban design’ is mainly used in Dutch professional circles to refer
to a scale of operation close to that of ‘architecture’.
Generalized knowledge does not have to be universally valid, but can also relate to a
specific region in space or time.
The ‘context of discovery’ is sometimes also referred to in the practical sciences as the
‘context of invention’. I am not in favour of the latter.

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

10

References
Audi, Robert, ed. 1995. The Cambridge Dictionory of Philosophy. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge
University Press.
Drenth, P.J.D.1995. “Psychology as a science: Truthful or Useful.” U&H (Tijdschrift voor
wetenschappelijk onderwijs), 41 (5/6): 147-168.
Gooding, David.1996. “Creative Rationality: Towards an abductive model of scientific change.”.
Philosophica 58: 103-123.
Hanson, Norwood R. 1958. Patterns of Discovery, an inquiry into the conceptual foundations of
science.Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Hillier, Bill and Alan Penn.1991. Is dense civilisation possible ?: Or the shape of cities in the 21st
century. London: The Bartlett, University College London.
Huisman, Patricia.1996. Kennis Gewogen – Analyse van sociaal-wetenschappelijk denken: kritiek
en aanwijzigingen. PhD thesis. Assen (Neth.): Van Gorcum.
Jacobs, Jane.1961. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House.
Klaasen, I.T. and M.Jacobs. 1999. “Relative Location Value Based on Accessibility: application of
a Useful Concept in Designing Urban Regions.” Landscape and Urban Planning, 45: 21-35.
Klaasen, I.T. 2000. “Architectural composition versus urban spatial pattern.” In Architectural
Design and Research: Composition, Education, Analysis, edited by C. Steenbergen et al. Bussum
(Neth): Thoth Publishers.
Koningsveld, Herman van. 1976: Het verschijnsel wetenschap. Meppel (Neth.): Boom.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd enlarged ed. 1970. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, Imre.1976. Proofs and Refutations - The logic of Mathematical Discovery (edited by John
Worrall and Elie Zahar).Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Lakatos, I. 1978. The Methodology of scientific research programmes. (edited by J.Worrall and
G.Currie). Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Lakatos, Imre.1999. “Lectures on Scientific Method.” In For and Against Method – Imre Lakatos
and Paul Feyerabend, edited by Matteo Motterlini. Chicago (USA): The University of Chicago
Press.
Langenhuizen, Anja, Marieke van Ouwerkerk and Jürgen Rosemann, editors. 2001. Research by
Design. Conference Proceedings. Delft (Neth.): Delft University Press.
Meyer, Han, Jan Heeling,John Westrik and Eugene Sauren. 2000. “The composition of the town
plan.” In Architectural Design and Research: Composition, Education, Analysis, edited by C.
Steenbergen et al. Bussum (Neth): Thoth Publishers.
Nercessian, Nancy. 1999. “Model-based Reasoning in Conceptual Change.”In Model-based

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

11

Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, edited by Lorenzo Magnani, Nancy Nersessian and Paul
Thagard. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Peursen C.A.van. 1986. Filosofie van de wetenschappen. Leiden (Neth.): Martinus Nijhoff.
Putnam, Hillary. 1974: “The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories.” reprinted in The Philosophy of Science,
1991, edited by Boyd, Richard, Philip Gasper and J.D. Trout. Cambridge (MA, USA): MIT Press.
Radder, Hans.1996: In and about the world: philosphical studies of science and technology. New
York: Albany State University of New York Press.
Radnitzky, Gerard. 1979. “Justifying a Theory.” In The Structure and the Development of Science,
edited by Gerard Radnitzky and Gunnar Andersson. Dordrecht (Neth.): D.Reidel Publishing
Company.
Roozenburg N.F.M. and J.Eekels. 1991. Produktontwerpen, structuur, en methoden. Utrecht
(Neth.): Lemma.
Schomberg, R. von. 1991. “Wat is er controversieel aan een wetenschappelijke controverse? De
omgang met wetenschap in het beleid.” Filosofie & Praktijk, 12 (2): 57-69.
Thagard, P. and D. Croft. 1999. “Scientific Discovery and Technological Innovation.” In Modelbased Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, edited by Lorenzo Magnani, Nancy Nersessian and Paul
Thagard. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Urbach, Peter. 1978. “The Objective Promise of a research Programme.” In Progress and
Rationality in Science; conference, Kronberg July1975, selected papers. Dordrecht (Neth.):
D.Reidel Publishing Company.
Veen, Arthur W.L. 1976. Schudden voor het gebruik, Een bijdrage aan de grondslagdiscussie in de
fysische geografie.Groningen (Neth.): H.D.Tjeenk Willink.

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

12

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

